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Introduction
This paper extends options-based mortgage default theory to include transaction costs.
According to option theory, without frictions and without a value to future exercise, the
borrower’s put option is in the money and is exercised whenever the value of the collateral
falls below the value of the mortgage. However, when transaction costs are considered,
the rational borrower will default only when the value of the collateral falls below the
mortgage value by an amount equal to the net transaction costs. These transaction costs
include the costs of moving, brokerage fees, taxes, future deﬁciency payments, and the
stigma associated with default; and are offset by free rents during delinquency. Since, for
most borrowers, net transaction costs are positive, standard measures of equity may be
signiﬁcantly negative by the time the rational borrower exercises the default option. This
research shows theoretically and empirically the effect of frictions on the individual strike
price.
While the frictionless default option model provides signiﬁcant structure to default
analysis, its only implication for equity loss severity is that it is expected to be zero.1
Under frictionless default, loss severity is not inﬂuenced by the origination loan-to-value
ratio (LTV), the property’s location, and many other variables that have been shown to
alter its value. (See, for example, Clauretie, 1990; Quigley and Van Order, 1992; Lekkas,
Quigley and Van Order, 1993.)
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Abstract. This paper extends options-based mortgage default theory to include transaction
costs. When transaction costs are considered, the rational borrower will default only when
the value of the collateral falls below the mortgage value by an amount equal to the net
transaction costs. Since, for most borrowers, net transaction costs are positive, standard
measures of equity may be signiﬁcantly negative by the time the rational borrower exercises
the default option. This research shows theoretically and empirically the effect of frictions
on the individual strike price. The addition of transaction costs to the theory provides
several testable implications for equity loss severity. First, the longer the foreclosure process
and the period of free rent to the borrower, the lower the severity. Second, severity will be
smaller when bankruptcy has been declared. Third, severity is decreasing in the contract
rate. Fourth, severity is increasing in the market interest rate. Finally, severity is a
decreasing function of the probability of a deﬁciency judgment. The empirical results, using
servicing and foreclosure data from a large northeastern thrift, support the theoretical
model.The addition of transactions costs to the theory provides several testable implications
for equity loss severity. First, the longer the foreclosure process and the period of free rent
to the borrower, the lower the severity. Second, severity will be smaller when bankruptcy
has been declared. Third, severity is decreasing in the contract rate. Fourth, severity is
increasing in the market interest rate. Finally, severity is a decreasing function of the
possibility of a deﬁciency judgment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two discusses related research. Section three
presents two models of loss severity—the ﬁrst is frictionless and the second includes
transaction costs with the frictionless model as a special case. The data sources, analysis
variables and sample exclusions are then discussed in section four. Then, empirical tests
of the implications of the theory are presented in the ﬁfth section. Finally, section six
ﬁnishes with a discussion of the results.
Related Literature
Two strands of literature are important to this study. The ﬁrst strand is concerned with
state differential methods of foreclosure and transactions costs. The second is related to
the put option structure of default modelling and the implications that derive from this
structure.
Transaction Costs, State Laws and Severity
Clauretie (1987, 1990) and Clauretie and Herzog (1989, 1990) develop models to measure
the effects of state laws on loan loss severity.2 Absent bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure is
governed by state, not national laws. Roughly half the states require the lender to bring a
judicial action to take title to the security. In these states, the court supervises a public
auction of the property and the lender is typically the high bidder.
The primary alternative to judicial foreclosure is the power-of-sale foreclosure,
available in nearly all the remaining states. The securing instrument in these cases is
usually a deed of trust, a three-party instrument between a borrower, a lender and a third
party, a trustee. The borrower conveys title to the trustee who has power of sale to satisfy
the debt in case of default. Power-of-sale states tend to have shorter average foreclosure
periods than judicial foreclosure states (Rosenblatt, 1994).
Phillips and Rosenblatt (1995) explore the effect on foreclosure of three major
deviations from the typical foreclosure process: bankruptcy, preforeclosure sale, and deed
in lieu of foreclosure. Under bankruptcy, a bankruptcy judge will supervise the
foreclosure, superseding state foreclosure law. In preforeclosure, the home is sold to a
third party, before foreclosure, and the proceeds are delivered to the lender. With deed in
lieu of foreclosure, the deed is surrendered to the lender in lieu of a foreclosure sale.
There also exist two important state-varying prerogatives: the borrower’s right of
statutory redemption and the lender’s claim to a deﬁciency recovery. The statutory right
of redemption is the right of the borrower in some states to redeem property, post-
foreclosure, upon payment of principal, accrued interest and the lender’s foreclosure
costs. Deﬁciency recovery, the right of the lender to pursue the borrower for unsecured
liabilities in excess of the value of the property, is available in all but six states.
Using FHA and mortgage insurance claim data, Clauretie (1987, 1990) and Clauretie
and Herzog (1989, 1990) ﬁnd that state foreclosure laws, right of redemption laws, and
deﬁciency judgment laws inﬂuence loan loss severity. Clauretie (1990) ﬁnds that the
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(1987) examines the joint determination of default rates and loan loss severity. This joint
determination results from lenders determining the time to foreclose on delinquent
mortgages as a function of expected default losses. Bible (1988) contrasts the different
legal environment of judicial and power-of-sale states and describes some of the
impediments to obtaining deﬁciency judgments against borrowers for funds never
recovered, even where the state laws allow it.
Option Models of Default
Modelling mortgage defaults as a put option of the borrower, which the lender passively
redeems, developed by Foster and Van Order (1984, 1985) and extended by Epperson,
Kau, Kennon and Muller (1985), has become standard in the mortgage termination
literature. According to the most simple version, the borrower will default when the value
of the home falls below the value of the loan balance.
Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) introduce additional costs to the borrower such
as stigma and credit problems and relocation costs, that may cause the borrower to defer
default until the option is deeper in the money. Ambrose, Buttimer and Capone (1995)
focus on the impact of the delay between the last paid installment and the foreclosure
date—and the associated “free rent”—and its effect on the exercise of the default option.
Vandell (1994) reviews default incidence evidence concerning the ruthlessness of the
exercise of the default option. Kau and Kim (1994), and Kau, Keenan and Kim (1992)
discuss future exercise of the default option as a motive for delaying the exercise of the
default option until it is deeper in the money.
The research in this paper extends the work of Quigley and Van Order (1992) and
Lekkas et al. (1993) who derive and test several implications from a frictionless default
model with respect to equity loss severity. Their ﬁndings are that, for most of their tests,
the frictionless model predictions are rejected and the frictionless model is an inadequate
tool for predictions concerning severity. Crawford (1993a), using Fannie Mae data, also
rejects these predictions.
Clauretie and Jameson (1990) ﬁnd evidence that the foreclosure process for FHA-
insured loans takes longer when market interest rates are lower than contract rates at the
default date. The theory relies on moral hazard on the part of lenders who are reimbursed
for lost interest by the FHA at the contract rate to the date of foreclosure.
Implications of Efﬁcient Default Exercise for Equity Loss Severity
This section discusses two models of equity loss severity. Both models are based on an
options-theoretic approach to mortgage default. The ﬁrst model is of a frictionless world.
The second includes transaction costs and other frictions and includes the frictionless
model as a special case.
Frictionless Defaults and Equity Loss Severity
The put option pricing paradigm in a frictionless Modigliani-Miller world provides
implications that are much stronger than many other economic theories allow.3 The value
of the put option and the probability of default are increasing in the mortgage amount,
EFFICIENT MORTGAGE DEFAULT OPTION EXERCISE 545the mortgage term, and the variance in home price appreciation. The value of the put
option and the probability of default are decreasing in the property value and the
discount rate.
These relationships have intuitive interpretations. An increase in the level of
indebtedness increases the probability that the property value will be below the level of
indebtedness and increases the probability of default. A longer mortgage term has two
effects that are in the same direction. The ﬁrst effect is that mortgage amortization is
slower the longer the term. This higher level of indebtedness leads to a higher probability
of default. The second effect is that a longer term increases the dispersion in the
distribution of property values and increases the probability that at some time in the life
of the mortgage the property value will fall below the level of indebtedness. An increase
in the variance of property value increases the probability that the property value will fall
below the level of indebtedness. An increase in the property value increases the
probability that the property value will be above the exercise price, the level of
indebtedness, and decreases the probability that default occurs.
A frictionless world is characterized by no transaction costs, no taxes, full information,
i.e., no measurement error, no ﬂows to the borrower from the asset, and no value to
future exercise of the option.4 Here, the borrower’s default rule is to default if V*[L,
where V* is the current property value and L* is the discounted present value of the
future mortgage payments. The implication is that there is no severity since V*2L50 at
default: borrowers default as soon as they have zero equity and do not delay defaulting
until they have negative equity.
Default Frictions and Equity Loss Severity
There are several reasons for default exercise and loss severity to differ from that
predicted in the model described above. This section discusses these differences and
formally includes many of them in the model.
First, properties provide either non-pecuniary or pecuniary value to the borrower.
Shelter to owner-occupants provides non-pecuniary value and rental income to investors
provides pecuniary value. Between default and foreclosure, and in some states between
foreclosure and the end of the redemption period, the borrower may enjoy these beneﬁts
as free rents.
Second, borrowers face a tax liability for the income that is gained when the default
option is exercised. The taxable amount is roughly the difference between the loan
amount and the property value. This is the extent to which the option to default is “in the
money” when it is exercised.
Third, borrowers may face deﬁciency judgments for all or a portion of the loss that they
cause the lender by defaulting.
Fourth, borrowers who have a discount mortgage, where the contract rate is less than
the market rate, may lose the value of the discount in default. Borrowers who have a
premium mortgage gain back the value of the premium when they default.
Finally, transaction or stigma costs exist and differ across borrowers. These transaction
costs can be pecuniary, taking the form of increased future borrowing costs, as well as
non-pecuniary, taking the form of negative social reaction to default.
If transaction costs, ﬂows to the borrower from the asset, and deﬁciency judgments are
included in the model, while full information is still assumed, then the borrower’s
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V* 5 the current value of the house;
c 5 transaction or stigma costs (that are not explicitly modeled elsewhere
in the equation) per dollar of loan amount;
L 5 the current mortgage balance;
Lm 5 the market value of the mortgage;
DJ 5 a deﬁciency judgment;
pr(DJ) 5 the probability of a deﬁciency judgment (pr(DJ) e (0,1));
r 5 the contract interest rate; and
FM 5 months in foreclosure.
The left side, the loss to the borrower, includes the current value of the house V*, the
transaction costs c · L, a potential deﬁciency judgment equaling the losses to the lender
L2V*1r · L · FM, with probability pr(DJ), and the difference between the current
mortgage balance and the market value of the mortgage L2Lm, due to interest-rate
change since origination. The right side, the gain to the borrower, is the current mortgage
balance L and the value of the free rent during the foreclosure months r · L + FM.
The ratio of the value of the property to the current loan amount is one measure of the
degree to which the option is “in the money” when exercised. At default, the ratio of the
value of the property to the current loan amount, if Lm is approximated by L
r – rm where rm
is the market interest rate,5 is:
BASE (00)
The expression
rm–r —– rm is the difference between the market rate and the contract rate as a
fraction of the market interest rate.
Equity loss severity can be expressed as:
BASE (00)
If net transaction costs are positive, then the ratio of the value of the property to the
current loan amount 
V* —
L is greater than one and severity is positive when the rational
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Comparative statics relating the ratio of the value of the property to the current loan
amount 
V* —
L to the other variables in the model provide testable implications of the
default model that incorporate transaction costs and other frictions. First, the ratio of
the value of the property to the current loan amount is decreasing in transaction costs
c. This relationship becomes more negative as the likelihood of a deﬁciency judgment
increases.
BASE (00)
The ratio of the value of the property to the current loan amount is increasing in the
number of months in foreclosure FM. This relationship is increasing in the contract
interest rate r, an approximation of the monthly value of free rent.
BASE (00)
The ratio of the value of the property to the current loan amount is decreasing in the
market interest rate rm. The borrower who defaults will face alternative housing costs that
are an increasing function of the market interest rate. This relationship becomes more
negative as the likelihood of a deﬁciency judgment increases.
BASE (00)
The ratio of the value of the property to the current loan amount is increasing in the
contract interest rate r. Borrowers with high contract rates are quicker to abandon the
mortgage by defaulting, while borrowers with low contract rates value their low rates and
delay defaulting. This relationship becomes stronger as the likelihood of a deﬁciency
judgment increases.
BASE (00)
The relationship between the ratio of the value of the property to the current loan
amount and the probability of a deﬁciency judgment is indeterminate. For most
borrowers, however, the relationship is likely to be positive. This relationship will be
negative only for premium mortgages where the contract rate exceeds the market rate as
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To test these implications, this research uses data from the servicing and foreclosure
tracking systems of a large northeastern thrift. This thrift serviced nearly twenty billion
dollars in residential and commercial real estate mortgage loans throughout the country.
Due to uninsured commercial real estate losses, this thrift was resolved by the Resolution
Trust Corporation in January 1991. The average annual default rate of about 1% for this
period is somewhat higher than the national average. Though this default rate was high
by industry standards, nearly 90% of foreclosed residential loans were covered by
mortgage insurance. Thus, the ﬁnancial impact of these residential loan defaults did not
play an integral role in the bank’s ultimate insolvency. The insolvency was caused from
uninsured commercial defaults.
From a cumulative set of over 200,000 residential real estate loans, data are available
for 2,619 defaults that occurred between August 1987 and December 1991.7 For all 2,619
defaults, the property’s state, the property’s metropolitan statistical area (MSA), the
unpaid principal balance, the contract interest rate, the original property value (the lesser
of the appraised value or the purchase price), the date of default, and the date borrower
turns over the deed are available from the servicing system. For 1,256 loans, the date of
the real estate-owned (REO) disposition sale and the proceeds of the REO sale are
known from a foreclosure tracking system.
The analysis data set includes all owner-occupied loans originating from 1979 through
1989 and consists of 2,295 observations. Last paid installments for these loans are from
1987 through 1991 with foreclosures occurring from 1988 through 1992. Exhibit 1
presents summary statistics for this data set.
Two methods are used to construct the ratio of the value of the property to the loan
amount at the time of the exercise of the default option 
V* —
L. One measure uses the REO
disposition sale price while the other uses the lesser of the original appraised value of the
property and the original purchase price of the property. In both methods the property
values are adjusted to the default option exercise date (approximated by the date of the
last paid installment) by a price index to reﬂect changes in home prices. The home price
indices used are Fannie Mae repeat-transaction home price indices based on merged
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac data at the least aggregated level—either the MSA level or
the state level—with a valid index for the entire ﬁrst quarter 1979 through third quarter
1994 period (see Li, 1995a, 1995b). In both measures, the measure of the loan amount is
the unpaid principal balance from the servicing records. Obviously, different measures of
the value of the property obtain from these two methods. Exhibit 2 presents correlation
coefﬁcients for these measures. Crawford (1993b) comments on a few possible reasons for
differences between measures of property values derived from REO sale prices and
property values derived from origination sale prices.
The market interest rate is the average interest rate for the quarter for thirty-year, ﬁxed-
rate, 80% loan-to-value ratio, conventional mortgages from the Freddie Mac Primary
Mortgage Market Survey.
The bankruptcy variable indicates that the borrower declared bankruptcy before
foreclosure. Bankruptcy is one measure of the additional transactions costs that
foreclosure brings to the borrower. Since a borrower who has declared bankruptcy
already has had his credit rating and future borrowing opportunities damaged and has
suffered any social stigma associated with bankruptcy, the additional costs of foreclosure
may be smaller.
EFFICIENT MORTGAGE DEFAULT OPTION EXERCISE 549There are four potential measures of the period that the borrower can receive free rent.
Three are measures of foreclosure time. One is the measure of the ability of the borrower
to live rent free after the foreclosure date. The ﬁrst measure of foreclosure time is the
average number of months from last paid installment to foreclosure for that property’s
state based on Fannie Mae historical foreclosure records. This is potentially a measure of
the vast array of foreclosure laws and their effects on foreclosure time. The second is the
actual number of months from last paid installment to foreclosure for the loan under
consideration. Finally, an indicator variable of judicial foreclosure states is considered.
Judicial foreclosure usually has the effect of lengthening the foreclosure time. Exhibit 2
presents correlation coefﬁcients for these three measures of the free rent period. The
judicial foreclosure state indicator variable is highly correlated with the average number
of months from last paid installment to foreclosure for that property’s state based on
Fannie Mae historical foreclosure records. A measure of the ability of the borrower to
live rent free after the foreclosure date is the redemption state indicator. While this is only
a rough measure, the right to redemption does provide the borrower with additional time
to claim the property.
The deﬁciency judgment state variable indicates whether state laws allow the borrower
to be subject to a deﬁciency judgment. Preforeclosure sale and deed-in-lieu indicators are
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Label N Mean Std Dev.
1/LTV_1 1191 .7816 .2986
Marked to market 1/LTV from REO sale
1/LTV_2 2295 1.2785 .6061
Marked to market 1/LTV from origination
BANKRUPT 2295 .0928 .2902
Bankruptcy declared
FORMTHS2 2295 13.2614 3.0587
Fannie Mae average months from LPI to foreclosure
FORMTHS1 2295 11.1509 4.7552
Actual months from LPI to foreclosure
JUDICIAL 2295 .4148 .4928
Judicial foreclosure state indicator
REDEMP 2295 .1508 .3579
Redemption state indicator
MKT_RAT1 2295 10.4599 .2939
Market rate at LPI
CNT_RAT1 2295 11.7027 1.7511
Contract rate at LPI
DEFIC 2295 .9272 .2598
Deﬁciency judgment state indicator
PRE_FOR 2295 .1129 .3165
Preforeclosure sale indicator
DEEDLIEU 2295 .0196 .1387
Deed in lieu indicator
RTC_DISP 2295 .3482 .4765
RTC disposition indicatoralso available for analysis. The RTC disposition indicator variable indicates that the
Resolution Trust Corporation disposed of the REO property.
Empirical Results
The relationship between the ratio of the value of the property to the current loan
amount 
V* —
L is estimated as a linear function of the number of months in foreclosure FM,
the contract interest rate rc, the market interest rate rm, the probability of a deﬁciency
judgment pr(DJ) and transactions or stigma costs c. The available data discussed in the
preceding section provide measures of these variables.
Estimates using the REO sale price to calculate the ratio of the value of the property
to the current loan amount 
V* —
L are presented in Exhibit 3. Estimates using the original
property value to calculate are presented in Exhibit 4. While measures of goodness of ﬁt
are low, almost all of the signs of the explanatory variables are as the theory predicts.
Also, the signiﬁcance of the parameters and the magnitudes are fairly robust across
speciﬁcations.
Speciﬁcations with and without a preforeclosure sale indicator, a deed in lieu indicator,
and a RTC disposition indicator are included in both tables. While these variables are not
in the theoretical model, they are considered because of their potential to affect the REO
sale price. The inclusion of these variables does inﬂuence the analysis of the other
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Exhibit 2
Pearson Correlation Coefﬁcients of Selected Variables
Pearson Correlation Coefﬁcients




Marked to market 1/LTV from REO sale .0 .0001
1191 1191
1/LTV_2 1.00000
Marked to market 1/LTV from origination .0
2295
FORMTHS2 FORMTHS1 JUDICIAL
FORMTHS2 1.0000 .3558 .8767
Fannie Mae avg. months from LPI to foreclosure .0 .0001 .0001
2295 2295 2295
FORMTHS1 1.0000 .2860
Actual months from LPI to foreclosure .0 .0001
2295 2295
JUDICIAL 1.0000
Actual months from LPI to foeclosure .0
2295parameters.
In Exhibit 3, the parameters of redemption state indicator, the market rate, and the
contract rate are all signiﬁcant at the .05 level. The parameters of bankruptcy and the
deﬁciency judgment state indicator are signiﬁcant at the .10 level. All of these parameters
have the predicted signs.
In Exhibit 4, the parameters of the measures of foreclosure months, the redemption
state indicator, and the contract rate are all signiﬁcant at the .05 level. The parameters of
the market rate and the judgment state indicator are signiﬁcant at the .10 level. All of
these parameters have the predicted signs.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper extends options-based mortgage default theory to include transaction costs.
When transaction costs are considered, the rational borrower will default only when the
value of the collateral falls below the mortgage value by an amount equal to the net
transaction costs. These transaction costs include the costs of moving, brokerage fees,
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Exhibit 3
Severity Equation with Marked to Market 1/LTV from REO Salea
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 1.9084** 1.8054** 1.7410** 1.8435** 1.7890**
(.323) (.333) (.331) (.330) (.334)
Bankruptcy declared .0525* .0507* .0141 .0430 .0489*
(.028) (.028) (.031) (.029) (.029)
Fannie Mae average months .0025 .0026** .0024
LPI to foreclose (.003) (.003) (.003)
Actual months from LPI .0056
to foreclose (.002)
Judicial foreclosure state 2.0275
indicator (.019)
Redemption state indicator .0528** .0550** .0577** .0442* .0544**
(.025) (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026)
Market rate at LPI 2.1166** 2.1071** 2.1041** 2.1080** 2.1064**
(.030) (.031) (.031) (.031) (.031)
Contract rate at LPI .0091* .0093* .0094** .0095** .0097**
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Deﬁciency judgment state 2.0615* 2.0614* 2.0582* 2.0459 2.0609*
indicator (.032) (.032) (.031) (.032) (.032)
Preforeclosure sale indicator .0635 .0723 .0727 .0670
(.063) (.063) (.063) (.064)
Deed in lieu indicator 2.0705 2.0445 2.0613 2.0678
(.055) (.055) (.054) (.055)
RTC disposition indicator .0110
(.018)
Number of observations 1191 1191 1191 1191 1191
R-squared .02 .03 .03 .03 .03
aStandard errors are in parentheses.
**signiﬁcant at the .05 level;  *signiﬁcant at the .10 leveltaxes, future deﬁciency payments, and the stigma associated with default; and are offset
by free rents during delinquency. Since, for most borrowers, net transaction costs are
positive, standard measures of equity may be signiﬁcantly negative by the time the
rational borrower efﬁciently exercises the default option. The empirical results support
the model; while measures of goodness of ﬁt are low, almost all the signs of the
explanatory variables are as the theory predicts. Also, the signiﬁcance of the parameters
and their magnitudes are fairly robust across speciﬁcations.
The consideration of transaction costs in default modelling is important for loss-per-
risk forecasting and accurate mortgage pricing. First, it is important to recognize that
these frictions inﬂuence a borrower’s strike price and that these vary in a predictable
manner. Second, the variables that increase severity are the variables that reduce the
probability of default. This implies that default probability and loss severity are not
independent.
This modelling approach also highlights the effect of the borrower’s behavior on
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Exhibit 4
Severity Equation with Marked to Market 1/LTV from Originationa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 1.7331** 1.6968** 1.7876** 2.0491** 1.5486**
(.397) (.409) (.411) (.413) (.407)
Bankruptcy declared .0616* .0583* 2.0613 .0457 .0423
(.035) (.035) (.038) (.036) (.035)
Fannie Mae average months .0262** .0269** .0256*
LPI to foreclose (.004) (.004) (.004)
Actual months from LPI .0155**
to foreclose (.003)
Judicial foreclosure state .0689**
indicator (.023)
Redemption state indicator .1614** .1691** .1576** .1647** .1634**
(.031) (.032) (.032) (.033) (.031)
Market rate at LPI 2.0685* 2.0659* 2.0600 2.0679* 2.0591
(.037) (.038) (.038) (.039) (.038)
Contract rate at LPI .0187* .0189** .0191** .0184** .0228**
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Deﬁciency judgment state 2.4039** 2.4032** 2.3706** 2.4025** 2.3983**
indicator (.0389) (.039) (.039) (.041) (.038)
Preforeclosure sale indicator .0130 .0440 .0188 .0362
(.063) (.078) (.079) (.078)
Deed in lieu indicator 2.1480** 2.0461** 2.1201* 2.1239*
(.067) (.068) (.068) (.067)
RTC disposition indicator .0989**
(.022)
Number of observations 1191 1191 1191 1191 1191
R-squared .12 .13 .11 .09 .14
aStandard errors are in parentheses.
**signiﬁcant at the .05 level;  *signiﬁcant at the .10 levelseverity. Strategic foreclosure behavior on the part of the lender is not required to obtain
differences in severity across states or across market interest rates.
There are several considerations that should be included in future modelling efforts.
Delaying the exercise of the default option as studied in Kau and Kim (1994), and Kau
et al. (1992) should be combined in a theoretical model that includes transaction costs to
give an empirical framework to test these potentially competing hypotheses.
Since borrowers face a potential tax liability for the income that is gained when the
default option is exercised, these tax liabilities should be included as another friction in
the model. The potentially taxable gain is roughly the difference between the loan
amount and the property value. This is the gain to the borrower from defaulting or the
extent to which the option to default is “in the money” when it is exercised. Also,
borrowers lose mortgage interest and other deductions with default. Tax rates differing
across states and localities and differential tax liabilities across states could be examined.
Also, properties provide either non-pecuniary or pecuniary value to the borrower.
Shelter to owner-occupants provides non-pecuniary value and rental income to investors
provides pecuniary value. A measure of owner-occupancy at default should be included
to determine its effect on the default decision.
Notes
1Equity loss severity, hereafter loss severity or simply severity, is the difference between the loan
amount and the value of the property when the borrower ceases payment on the mortgage. This
contrasts with a common deﬁnition of severity, loan loss severity, which is the total of all default-
related losses to the lender and/or the insurer.
2See Note 1 for a deﬁnition of loan loss severity.
3For a good presentation of this topic see Black and Scholes (1973).
4In a frictionless world, future exercise of an option has no value, since it could be exercised and
repurchased repeatedly without transaction costs.
5This approximation is exact only for an interest-only perpetual loan. The accuracy is decreasing in
the portion of the monthly payment comprised by principal. So, the approximation is most
accurate early in the life of a mortgage.
6The ratio of the value of the property to the current loan amount 
V* — L differs from severity by a
constant and is perfectly negatively correlated with severity.
7There were actually over 5,000 defaults from the 200,000 loans at risk between 1985 and 1990. Due
to missing data tapes, only 2,619 defaults were recorded in the foreclosure data system and are
available for analysis.
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